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federal courts. Schwegmann Brothers, Louisiana retailers and long
time foe of "fair trade," challenged this Act on grounds that it violates
the due process clause of the Federal Constitution and constitutes an
unlawful delegation of legislative power to private individuals. The
Louisiana Federal District Court in Ely Lilly Co. v. Schwegmann
Bros.25 upheld the constitutionality of the Act. In General Electric v.
Klein on the Square29 the New York Supreme Court declared the
McGuire Act constitutional as not being in contravention of the due
process or equal protection clauses and not an unlawful delegation of
legislative power. Ultimately the United States Supreme Court may
rule on the constitutionality of the McGuire Act and its sanction of the
controversial non-signers clause. 30 Since the Supreme Court of the
United States has already held that the Fair Trade Acts do not con-
travene the Fourteenth Admendment in intrastate commerce"' it is quite
unlikely that it will now hold the McGuire Act as applied to interstate
transactions is violative of the Fifth Amendment.
Although most states will leave the economic wisdom of Fair Trade
Acts to the Legislature and hence those declaring such Acts to be un-
constitutional will remain in the minority, it is evident that the courts
will give more careful scrutiny to this legislation in the future than has
been true in the past.
JoHN RALPH CAMBRON
Unfair Competition-Export Trade Act-Unfair Methods of
Competition under Section Four
The Sherman Act of 1890 prohibited concerted action by inde-
pendent exporters including the formation of trade associations for
the purpose of eliminating competition among themselves in foreign
trade.' The importance of allowing American exporters to combine
into such an association was stressed in a report submitted to Congress
by the Federal Trade Commission in 1916.2 Spurred by this report,
2'TRADE REG. REP., CURRENT COURT DECISIONS, ff 67,443 (1953).
D 109 F. Supp. 269 (1953).
" The Supreme Court of the United States has never passed directly on the
constitutionality of the Miller-Tydings Act.
" Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagrams-Distillers, Corp., 299 U. S. 183
(1936).
' The Sherman Act prohibits: "Every contract, combination . . . or con-
spiracy, in restraint of trade.... ." 26 STAT. 209 (1890), as amended by 50 STAT.
693 (1937), 15 U. S. C. §§ 1-7 (1946).
'Public hearings were conducted in 16 cities; several thousand questionnaires
were sent out to interested individuals and firms; American consuls and com-
mercial attaches sent in reports; a study of the ramifications of foreign cartel
arrangements was made. On June 30, 1916, this report on Cooperation in Amer-
can Export Trade was submitted to Congress. This report may be found in
EXPORT PRIcEs AND EXPORT CARTELS (WEBB-PoMERENE ASSOCIATIONS) 113-118
(TNEC Monograph 6, 1941). See also Love, The Export Trade Act, 8 Go.
WAsHr. L. REv. 608 (1940).
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Congress enacted the Export Trade Act (otherwise known as the
Webb-Pomerene Act) on April 10, 1918.3 The terms of the Webb-
Pomerene Act specifically enable independent exporters to combine
into an association and set forth the conditions under which such an
association may be organized. Congress, however, was aware of the
'dangers inherent in permitting such a combination, and therefore in-
cluded certain restrictive provisions in the Webb-Pomerene Act to gov-
ern the activities of these associations. 4 Section 4,5 one of the restrictive
provisions, prohibits unfair methods of competition in export trade.
Unlike the other sections of the Act, it embraces not only the conduct
of export associations but also the acivities of any individual business-
man engaged in export trade.
Section 4 reads:
"The prohibition against 'unfair methods of competition' and
the remedies provided for enforcing said prohibition contained
in the Federal Trade Commission Act shall be construed as ex-
tending to unfair methods of competition in export trade, even
though the acts constituting such unfair methods are done without
the territorial jurisdiction of the United States." 6
Both the 1916 Report7 to Congress by the Federal Trade Commission
and the ensuing legislative history8 of the Act lend weight to the con-
clusion that the conduct of single firms as well as export associations
are within the purview of Section 4. In United States v. United States
Alkali Export Ass'n., Inc., et al.,9 it was stated that "The effect of Sec-
tion 4 . . . was to condemn such 'unfair methods of competition'
wherever committed . . . this section [does not] draw any distinction
between organizations organized under previous sections of the Webb
'40 STAT. 516 (1918), 15 U. S. C. §§ 61-65 (1946). For two years Congress
gave the provisions of this act a thorough examination. In 1916, Representative
Edwin Y. Webb from North Carolina introduced H. R. 16707, 64th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1916) and H. R. 17350, 64th Cong., 2d Sess. (1916). Again in 1917
Representative Webb introduced H. R. 2316, 65th Cong., 1st Sess. (1917) (this
bill was eventually passed by both houses), ,and Senator Atlee Pomerene from
Ohio introduced S. 634, 65th Cong., 1st Sess. (1917).
'40 STAT. 517 (1918), 15 U. S. C. § 62 (1946); 40 STAT. 517 (1918), 15
U. S. C. § 63 (1946); 40 STAT. 517 (1918), 15 U. S. C. § 64 (1946); 40 STAT.
517 (1918), 15 U. S. C. § 65 (1946).
'40 STAT. 517 (1918), 15 U. S. C. § 64 (1946).
'Id.
'Report on Cooperation in American Export Trade as reported in EXPORT
PRICES AND EXPORT CARTELS (WEBB-POMERENE ASSOCIATIONS) 117-118 (TNEC
Monograph 6, 1941).
' See 55 CON. REc. 2786 (1917) ; 55 CONG. RE. 3577 (1917) ; 56 CONG. RFc.
69 (1917) ; 56 CONG. RFc. 111 (1917) ; 56 CoNG. REc. 171 (1917); 56 CONG: REC.
173 (1917).
'United States v. United States Alkali Expbrt Ass'n., Inc., et al., 86 F. Supp.
59 (S. D. N. Y. 1949).
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Act and other corporations engaging in export trade."'10 Although the
Federal Trade Commission has brought several proceedings under
Section 4, none have been directed against an export association.,,
It is interesting to note that the authority of the Federal Trade
Commission is confined to investigatory functions under all the pro-
visions of the Webb-Pomerene Act except Section 4.12 Under Section
4 the Commission is empowered to determine that unfair methods of
competition have been employed and then to command the violator to
cease and desist. 1
3
Since 1918 the Federal Trade Commission has proceeded against
individual respondents only twelve times under this Section. Six com-
plaints resulted in cease and desist orders and six complaints were dis-
missed. The following practices have been attacked as "unfair methods
of competition" in export trade: labeling condensed milk cans so that
they mislead the consumer as to the place of manufacture ;14 misrepre-
senting the quality of apples ;15 misrepresenting products as to certain
iron and steel specialities ;16 selling inferior or worthless automobiles and
automobile parts as new ;17 filling orders for wheat with grades inferior
to that specified ;18 representing and selling as new, certain trucks, auto-
mobiles, and parts which were unusable ;19 failing to adhere to contract
obligations in the exportation of coal ;20 employing threats of an infringe-
O Id. at 67.
" Branch v. Federal Trade Commission, 141 F. 2d 31 (7th Cir. 1944); Nestle
Food Co., Inc., 2 F. T. C. 171 (1919) ; Caravel Co., Inc., 6 F. T. C. 198 (1923) ;
Carnick Bros. Co., 6 F. T. C. 515 (1923); Pacific Commercial Co., et al., 10
F. T. C. 458 (1926); Barnes-Ames Co., et al., 10 F. T. C. 460 (1926); M. Rea
Gano, 11 F. T. C. 492 (1928); Robert M. Lease Co., Inc., et al., 12 F. T. C. 85
(1928) ; Edmond Waterman et al., 12 F. T. C. 509 (1928) ; Bond Bros. & Co., Inc.,
15 F. T. C. 445 (1931); Export Petroleum Co. of Calif., Ltd., 17 F. T. C. 119
(1932); Lake Erie Chemical Co., et al., 29 F. T. C. 67 (1939).
1" Section 5 of the Webb-Pomerene Act gives the Federal Trade Commission
authority to investigate any conduct by an export association which may restrain
domestic or export trade, to make recommendations for correction of this con-
duct, and to refer its recommendations and findings to the Attorney General. 40
STAT. 517 (1918), 15 U. S. C. § 65 (1946). In United States Alkali Export
Ass'n., Inc., et al., 325 U. S. 196, 210 (1945) the Supreme Court stated "that the
only function of the Federal Trade Commission under § 5 of the Webb-Pomerene
Act is to investigate, recommend and report. It can give no remedy. It can
make no controlling finding of law or fact. Its recommendation need not be
followed by any court or administrative or executive officer."
"3 In Branch v. Federal Trade Commission, 141 F. 2d 31 (7th Cir. 1944) the
respondent appealed from a cease and desist order by the Federal Trade Com-
mission, Joseph G. Branch, 36 F. T. C. 1 (1943), and the Court of Appeals for
the seventh circuit affirmed the order.
'Nestle Food Co., Inc., 2 F. T. C. 171 (1919) (cease and desist order
issued).
15 Caravel Co., Inc., 6 F. T. C. 198 (1923) (cease and desist order issued).
" Carnick Bros. Co., 6 F. T. C. 515 (1923) (complaint dismissed).
"' Pacific Commercial Co., et al., 10 F. T. C. 458 (1926) (complaint dis-
missed).Barnes-Ames Co., et al., 10 F. T. C. 460 (1926) (complaint dismissed).
19 M. Rea Gano, 11 F. T. C. 492 (1928) (complaint dismissed).




ment suit against competitors in the sale of certain fruits ;21 misrepre-
senting the quality and sale terms of bailed newspapers ;22 failing to fill.
gasoline containers to capacity and thus allowing respondent's vendees,.
in selling to the ultimate consumer, to misrepresent the quantity of gaso-
line being sold ;23 and misrepresenting the quality and source of certain
chemicals and other material used in warfare.2 1
Of the twelve proceedings, only one, Branch v. Federal Trade Com-
Mission,25 reached the federal courts. In this case the charge was ad-
vertising falsely the qualifications and academic standards of a corre-
spondence school which extended its services into Latin America. The
petitioner claimed that the Commission did not have jurisdictionbecause
he was not engaged in commerce and because the acts in question took
place in Latin America. The court repudiated these arguments by
ruling that (1) sending "books, instructions, and written examinations
. . . is 'commerce' within the meaning of the Constitution and the Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act"26 and, (2) the Federal Trade Commission
has the power "to protect the petitioner's competitors from . . . unfair
practices, begun in the United States and consummated in Latin
America." 27 In finding a violation of Section 4, the Court of Appeals
for the seventh circuit had to determine that export trade, as -defined
in the Webb-Pomerene Act, was involved.28
Another significant feature of the Branch case is the fact that the
court made it clear that Section 5 of .the Federal Trade Commission
Act had also been violated.2 9 If acts committed in foreign commerce,
are condemned by Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act as
well as Section 4 of the Webb-Pomerene Act, is there any necessity for
resorting to Section 4? The legislative history of the Webb-Pomerene
Act indicates that Section 4 was probably inserted primarily to allay
the fears of those who opposed combinations in export trade, to prevent
export associations from using their position unfairly against individual
exporters.30  However, as previously indicated, the Commission has
yet to direct Section 4 against an export association. Inconsistent as
it may seem, Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act is
broader than Section 4 of the Webb-Pomerene Act. While Section
" Edmond Waterman et al., 12 F. T. C. 509 (1928) (complaint dismissed).
" Bond Bros. & Co., Inc. 15 F. T. C. 445 (1931) (complaint dismissed).
"' Export Petroleum Co. of Calif., Ltd., 17 F. T. C. 119 (1932) (cease and
desist order issued).
"' Lake Erie Chemical Co., et al., 29 F.T.C. 67 (1939) (cease and desist
order issued).
"
2 Branch v. Federal Trade Commission, 141 F. 2d 31 (7th Cir. 1944). The
cease and desist order in the case was obtained under Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act. Joseph G. Branch, 36 F. T. C. 1 (1943). Section 4 of
the Webb-Pomerene Act was introduced into the proceeding when the case was
appealed to the Court of Appeals for the seventh circuit.
2' Branch v. Federal Trade Commission, 141 F. 2d 31, 34 (7th Cir. 1944).
27 Id. at 35. 2- Id. at 36.
20 Id. at 35. 20 See note 8 mipra.
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4 contains the language "unfair methods of competition,"3 ' thus re-
quiring that the act complained of not only being unfair but also
a method of competition in export trade.3 2  Section 5 now reads
"unfair methods of competition in commerce and unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in commerce."33  This latter addition to Section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act has been interpreted to mean that
it is only necessary to show an unfair act in commerce. 4  It appears
that the Federal Trade Commission can rely on Section 5 of the Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act entirely in assailing inequitable practices in
export trade. However, it is the Commission's opinon that without
Section 4 of the Webb-Pomerene Act there would be doubt as to their
jurisdiction over acts committed in foreign countries.35
Whether the Commission will rely on Section 4 of the Webb-
Pomerene Act of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, it is
apparent that the enforcement of the anti-trust laws in the area of in-
ternational trade is definitely increasing. Two recent cases prosecuted
by the Attorney General under the Sherman Act clearly indicate that
export associations organized under the Webb-Pomerene Act are not
exempted from the Sherman Act for all purposes.3 6 If the acts com-
plained of amount to a restraint of trade, the association is still subject
to prosecution by the Attorney General.3 7  Thus it must be noted
that the fact that the Federal Trade Commission may proceed under
Section 4 of the Webb-Pomerene Act or Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act does not necessarily preclude the Attorney General
from proceeding under the Sherman Act. Although it is difficult to
predict the extent to which Section 5 will be employed, it may be
3140 STAT. 517 (1918), 15 U. S. C. § 65 (1946) [emphasis added].
"The terms "unfair methods of competition" in Section 4 of the Webb-
Pomerene Act are the same terms that were found in Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act prior to the Wheeler-Lea amendment to the Federal Trade
Commission Act in 1938. The meaning of "unfair methods of competition" was
determined in Federal Trade Commission v. Raladam Co., 283 U. S. 643 (1931).
"38 STAT. 719 (1914), as amended by 52 STAT. 111 (1938), 15 U. S. C. § 45
(1946) [emphasis added].
" The terms "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce," as added to
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act by the Wheeler-Lea Act in
1938, have been interpreted in Pep Boys-Manny, Moe & Jack v. Federal Trade
Commission, 122 F. 2d 158 (3d Cir. 1941) ; Chas. A. Brewer & Sons v. Federal
Trade Commission, 158 F. 2d 74 (6th Cir. 1946) and many other cases.
" In correspondence to the writer of this note, dated April 24, 1953, the
Federal Trade Commission stated: "Section 4 of the Export Trade Act was
passed because there was some doubt as to whether the Commission had juris-
diction under the Federal Trade Commission Act over acts committed in foreign
countries. There was no doubt, however, of the Commission's jurisdiction in
cases involving imports or exports because the law has always applied to 'com-
merce' which includes both interstate and foreign."
" United States v. United States Alkali Export Ass'n., Inc., et al., 86 F. Supp.
59. (S. D. N. Y. 1949); United States v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing
Co.. et al., 92 F. Supp. 947 (D. C. Mass. 1950).1 7 d.
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used to protect competitors and foreign consumers from American ex-




The specific legatee of an automobile sought to collect the proceeds
of an insurance policy on the automobile after an accident in which it
was damaged. The testatrix sustained injuries in the accident which
resulted in her subsequent death. The insurance company paid to the
executor the value of the automobile after the accident and took pos-
session of it as salvage. The court held that the executor was entitled
to the proceeds of the policy and that the legatee was entitled only to
the value of the automobile as of the death of the testatrix. The in-
surance policy was held to be a personal contract between the testatrix
and the insurer, hence the legatee had no interest therein.1
The case clearly illustrates how the relationship of the death of a
testator and the damage or destruction of a specific legacy may produce
varied results. That is, since the rights of the legatee are ordinarily de-
termined as of the death of the testator,2 it will be important whether
the damage or destruction of the legacy or -devise occurred prior to
or subsequent to the testator's death.
In the first instance, i.e., where the damage.or destruction occurred
prior to the death, the law of ademption controls. 3 Without elaborating
on the intricacies of ademption, suffice it to say that ordinarily ademp-
tion is defined as the taking away of the subject matter of a specific
legacy 4 or devise by its destruction, or its disposition by the testator in
his lifetime. 5 Therefore, if the specific legacy or devise is damaged or
8 This would certainly seem to be the conclusion to be drawn from Branch
v. Federal Trade Commission, 141 F. 2d 31 (7th Cir. 1944) ; Nestle Food Co.,
Inc., 2 F. T. C. 171 (1919); Caravel Co., Inc., 6 F. T. C. 198 (1923); Robert
M. Lease Co., Inc., et al., 12 F. T. C. 85 (1928) ; Export Petroleum Co. of Calif.,
Ltd., 17 F. T. C. 119 (1932); Lake Erie Chemical Co., et al., 29 F. T. C. 67
(1939)
'It re Barry's Estate, 252 P. 2d 437 (Okla., 1952). Accord, Ind. Mutual
Cyclone Ins. Co. v. Rinard, 102 Ind. App. 546, 200 N. E. 452 (1936) ; Converse
v. Boston Safe Deposit and Trust Co., 315 Mass. 544, 53 N. E. 2d 841 (1944) ;
In re Hilpert's Estate, 165 Misc. 430, 300 N. Y. Supp. 886 (Sur. 1937); III
AmERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 14.32 (1952).2 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 31-41 (1943 Recomp. 1950).
'In re Hilpert's Estate, 165 Misc. 430, 300 N. Y. Supp. 886 (Sur. 1937) ;III
AMERICAN LA W OF PROPERTY § 14.32 (1952) where it is stated: "The right
to recover on a fire insurance policy when the loss occurred in the lifetime of
decedent passes to his personal representatives, as in case of any other chose in
action; this recovery is for the general benefit of the estate and not for the
devisee or others entitled to the land."
'28 R. C. L. WILLS § 341 (1921).
'Green v. Green, 231 N. C. 707, 58 S. E. 2d 722 (1950) ; Tyner v. Meadows,
215 N. C. 733, 3 S. E. 2d 264 (1939) ; King v. Sellars, 194 N. C. 533, 140 S. E.
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